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Ordinary Mind
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi
Ordinary things, though they may be called ‘constant,’* 1 are in fact 
inconstant, mutually limiting, and contradictory. They do not persist 
forever. To be “ordinarily existent” means that there must be a profusion 
of similar things which exist everywhere, and at every time; however, 
this is not the same as saying that truth is immutable. Ordinary things 
are things which did not exist at one time but now exist, things which exist 
now but will later cease to exist. However, that which is merely inconstant 
cannot be said to be in a state of being. In order that things which are in 
a state of being be in some degree knowable, it is necessary that there be 
a sense in which they abide without change. Temporally, they must con­
tinue without interruption for a certain period of time; spatially, they 
must occupy a certain place and stay there. In this sense, it must be said 
that even ordinary things have that constituent character of reality (a 
“Moment”)2 which is constancy. That is to say, they have the charac­
teristic of maintaining and asserting themselves. No matter what ordinary 
things are considered, there are none which are without constancy, none 
which do not maintain themselves. In other words, there are no ordinary 
things without self-nature.
• The original text of this article, Hrijdshui (lit., “quelled or tranquil, constant
mind**; here rendered as “ordinary mind’*), first published in the Iivanami-kdza rinrigaku 
series (Tokyo, 1941), is found in Hisamatsu Shin'izhi chosakushu (Tokyo, 1972), volume 2, 
pp. 103-128. Footnotes have been provided by the translators, who wish to thank 
Mr. Steve Antinoff, Prof. Morris J. Augustine, and Ms. Michele Martin for their as­
sistance at various stages of the translation.
1 J6 # (“constant**) in the expression hrijo no mono (“ordinary [constant] things*’). 
This expression is used in this article along with several others in a sense which is inter­
changeable with the term heijoshin,
2 keiki. Japanese rendering of the Hegelian dialectical term Moment.
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Lacking'^these conditions, nothing can be said to exist. Even inanimate 
things, in that they exist, always have constancy. If they did not have 
constancy, they could not even be perceived. Things which are merely in 
“flux” cannot be perceived. It is also impossible to know those things 
which are in flux, while they are in flux, unless the flux is arrested without 
disturbing the flux. What Bergson calls “intuition” differs from the kind 
of perception wherein one sees things which are in flux by cutting across 
the flux and arresting them. Rather, his “intuition” must be taken to 
mean that one sees things which are in flux by arresting them while they 
are in flux. To enter the flow and to come to know that flow by flowing 
together with it, necessarily entails that one enter the flow and arrest it 
parallel to the direction of the current, rather than across the current. 
Bergson’s intuition, then, involves arresting the flow parallel to the direc­
tion of the flow. Without the complete arrest of the flow, there can be no 
“intuition.” The flow, while flowing, must at the same time be in a state 
of arrest.3
3 While the author is here referring to central terms in the philosophy of Bergson 
which appear in devolution crfatrice, the Buddhist notion of "duration” is no doubt being 
referred to as well.
It might be supposed that “intuition” means to enter a flow from with­
out and to unite oneself with it. But that which arrests the flow is not some­
thing which enters the flow from the outside, and further, intuition must 
be that which already exists within the flow itself. A flow which does not 
contain within itself that which arrests is merely a lifeless, physical flow. 
If the flow in question is taken to necessarily mean the living flow of life, 
then intuition must mean that the flow itself has totally arrested itself, 
while continuing to flow as itself. In other words, that which intuits 
must not be something which enters the flow from the outside; instead 
it must have arrested the flow within the flow itself, and done so in com­
plete unity with the flow.
However fast the flow, even if it is so fast that nothing which might be 
described as the “present” exists, intuition must be that which makes the 
present be. True flow can be said to mean that there is no present. That 
a flow-without-present is itself the present is due to the fact that the entire 
flow is the present. In other words, it is not that the present results from 
arresting the flow by cutting across the flow and blocking it. Rather, it 
is that the present resides in the arrest of the flow even as it continues to 
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flow. Such a “present” is that present which cannot even be called the 
‘present.’ The present of the true flow must be a ‘present’ in this sense. 
To restate the matter, it is not that the present is cut off from the past and 
the future, but that the present must be without distinction of past, ‘present,’ 
and future. The present must be none other than the time wherein the dis­
tinction of before, during, and after has ceased. If the ‘present* is grasped 
only in terms of the common conception of its nature, the perception 
of that which is in flow is impossible. If, by the perception of flow, one 
means that that which is in flow is arrested in the ‘present,’ in the every­
day sense, then this kind of perception will end in the negation of the 
flow, in the annihilation of the flow, and in the failure to perceive the 
flow. Therefore, in Bergson’s “intuition” as well, there must be an arrest­
ing. This arresting is an important “Moment” for contemplative per­
ception. When that which arrests remains outside that which is arrested, 
the result is a duality of perceiving subject and perceived object; when 
there is, outside that which is arrested, nothing which arrests, the result 
is a kind of monism.
To continue the discussion in a dialectical frame of reference, there is 
a sense in which an ordinary thing is a “synthesis.” Synthesis, as synthesis, 
is in any case a unity of contradictions, a quelling of them. Synthesis finds 
itself when and where its contradictions are quelled; it then is smoothed 
out, and settles into position. Settled, it becomes quiet. It finds repose, 
gains constancy, and attains the present. In the present there is stability 
and composure. Since in ordinariness there is the quality of the present, 
man, in his ordinariness, can feel at ease and live his life.
In this way, what is ordinary has the nature of synthesis; it is subdued, 
in a state of arrest, composed, and in a state of undisturbed peace. Herein 
lies affirmation of the present state of affairs. A sense of security, of and by 
itself, is an illustration of this “synthesis.” Since synthesis is not en route 
toward an end but that end achieved, it must inevitably have an enduring 
and self-preserving nature. Contradiction is the principle of movement; 
synthesis is the principle of arrest. Contradiction is insecurity; synthesis 
is security. The distinctive characteristic of synthesis, as synthesis, is that 
it demands constancy. This being the case, the nature of synthesis is re­
sponsible for the appearance of the craving for an indolent life, optimism, 
the desire to preserve the status quo* peace-at-any-price-ism, mediocrity, 
banality, and conservative behavior. This is unavoidable, insofar as 
ordinary things inherently possess the aspect of synthesis. But at the same 
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time, these attitudes result from mistaking the aspect of synthesis of 
ordinary things for something eternal.
That man views the world solely in its aspect of “being” or “constancy” 
is because he erroneously takes the synthetic aspect of ordinary things for 
something ultimate, or at least for something enduring. In other words, 
since man assumes anything that ‘is’ to be ultimate in its existence, in 
health he forgets disease, in life he forgets death, in peace he forgets war, 
in order he forgets disorder.
However, an ordinary thing is no mere synthesis; it is antithesis, at the 
same time. No ordinary thing is, at any moment, without contradiction, 
in either the horizontal or vertical dimension. A synthesis does not remain 
as it is, it becomes antithesis. That ordinary things become commonplace, 
hackneyed, boring, pervaded with mediocrity, and forever stale and 
without progress, is because they are not merely syntheses but simultane­
ously antitheses [and antithesis reveals to us the negative aspect of syn­
thesis]. It is because ordinary things ultimately cannot come to arrest in 
themselves as ultimate synthesis. Contradiction is thus movement and 
anxiety. It is inconstant and without stability. Because contradiction is 
without stability, it is said to have no self-nature, to be “non-being,” and 
“emptiness.” When only this aspect of ordinary things is perceived, the 
world will come to be seen as shot through with contradiction, and one 
cannot but fall into a pessimism which laments the transience of life. In 
constancy there is nothing to be taken as constant; constancy always 
confronts its negation. Stability, in and of itself, stares directly into crisis. 
In this lies the destructive one-sidedness which sees only the contradictory 
aspect of ordinary things, a perspective brought about by a partial view 
that takes ordinary things as “non-being.”
Man cannot comfortably live in inconstancy. As a consequence of the 
view which would have it that the world is ‘inconstant,’ one comes to hate 
this world of inconstancy and to retire from it. There then arises an idea, 
typified in the recluse, by which one tries to attain a world of eternal life, 
lending significance to the inconstant world as a mere process of prepara­
tion for the achievement of the eternal realm. This being so, one either 
views one’s life in this world as a temporary stage, or, if the eternal life 
cannot be admitted as a possibility, one lives in this world by, as it were, 
resigning oneself to inconstancy, taking it to be one’s inexorable fate— 
there are no other alternatives.
It is wrong to consider ordinary things to be exclusively constant and 
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“existent” (a), but it is also inappropriate to see them as being exclusively 
inconstant and “non-existent” (ma).4 Ordinary things are at once constant 
and inconstant, existent and non-existent. Because of his constancy, man 
has the capacity to feel always at ease; because of his inconstancy, man 
also feels always anxious. However, anxiety pledges development into 
further constancy. Thus, the structure of ordinary things is one of constancy 
which is none other than inconstancy, unity which is none other than 
contradiction, being which is none other than non-being. Only in this 
way may we truly understand ordinary things.
* M mu. In a relative sense in contrast to “being” (< u).
5 htizei gejo. A term used by the Japanese Pure Land teacher Rennyo (d.
1499), to indicate that one attains non-retrogressive conviction in thia life that one will 
realize nirvana in the Pure Land, only with the total acceptance of the truthfulness of 
the Original Vow of Dharmikara.
The structure of human history can also be understood on the basis 
of the fact that ordinary things possess the kind of structure just described. 
If ordinary things were merely “being” («), the movement of history 
would not materialize, while if they were merely “non-being” (mu), the 
presentness of history would not make itself manifest. It is for this reason 
that the historical world is said to be being which is none other than 
non-being, non-being which is none other than being. The necessity for 
the adoption of the ethical principle that in peace one ought not to forget 
war, and that in war one ought not to forget peace, finds its basis in the 
fact that ordinary things are of the same structure.
It is because one must be prepared, so as not to fall into confusion in 
the face of crisis, that it is said that for man, ordinariness is a matter of 
great import, or that “everyday life is the very place where the work of 
redemption is to be carried out.”J But being genuinely composed and 
imperturbable in the face of crisis becomes possible when man’s ordinari­
ness consists of a synthesis in which all foreseeable and conceivable antithe­
ses are unified. This is ordinariness of the sort which enables one to respond 
immediately to the various contingencies. It is only by actualizing ordi­
nariness in this sense—the kind of ordinariness that is alert and unbrokenly 
responsive—that one is able to overcome crisis. Man’s ordinariness, 
whether deep or shallow, is invariably of this character. Because this is 
so, in responding to the various circumstances of their lives and the facts 
of their environment, men are able to make everyday decisions and act 
in the world. And yet, when ordinariness as synthesis lacks greatness and *5
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depth, the freedom to make decisions and to act in immediate response 
to circumstances is an impossibility.
An ordinariness which can immediately respond, on encountering the 
various affairs of daily life, is an “intelligent” ordinariness. Such ordinari­
ness is often witty and intuitive. Keen wits which “see everything at a 
glance” or reach “accord on the spot” fall into this category.6 The un­
hindered freedom exercised in brilliant repartee is also of this type. The 
lightning quick movements of the masters of the martial arts are not 
merely “intelligent,” but a unity of decision and action; these movements 
consist in ordinariness as a deep synthesis which is always prepared. 
The essence of the various traditional arts resides in the fact that at base 
their ordinariness is comprised of a synthesis in which all the antitheses 
of the art have been overcome. A master of an art is a person whose ordi­
nariness is of this variety.
6 ikktn benktn and jikige jo to, respectively. Both are commonly used
Zen terms.
7 koshirr, ch., htng-hsin. Cf. Mencius iT.
The “steady mind”7 means the moral ordinary mind. It is an unshake­
able moral mind which is never lost, no matter what situation is en­
countered. If morality is not to be limited to a mere equation for moral 
judgment, such as conscience, but must be considered to include matters 
of content and substance as well, then the “steady mind” must be an 
ordinariness in which the intellectual and active faculties have become 
one. The “steady mind,” in that it morally judges and criticizes even the 
ordinariness of the martial arts and the various other arts, is of the highest 
order among man’s faculties. That it is necessary for man to come to 
possess the “steady mind” holds true even for masters of the arts.
The way of the samurai (bushido) is perfected through the harmoniza­
tion of the “steady mind” and the essence of the martial arts. Without 
this “steady mind,” the martial arts easily degenerate into something 
demonic. The moral aspect of ordinariness must not base itself on naive, 
good-natured virtuousness, or other outlooks which have no knowledge 
of the existence of evil. It must be grounded on a thorough knowledge of 
all possible forms of evil, and be able to respond promptly in the face of 
every evil force. Consequently, the moral aspect of ordinariness must be 
fully tempered by every possible antithesis. In people who are innately 




In the everyday ‘ordinary (Jvijo) mind,’ which we often refer to in or­
dinary discourse, there is something endowed with the quality of constancy 
on which we can rest and rely. This constancy, however, not having 
undergone disciplining, is easily negated. Common sense is also a kind of 
ordinary constant mind; in our daily lives we tend to depend on it, and it 
allows us to get along. But, when we encounter an antithesis of any con­
siderable extent, common sense is swiftly negated.
The knowledge of the specialist is such that, within the confines of his 
particular subject matter, it is not readily negated by antithesis. With 
regard to their respective arts and techniques, masters and experts have 
completely overcome all the difficult barriers of antithesis and attained 
to the wondrous realm of self-autonomous freedom. It is thus, having 
become the art-itself, that they may be called “incarnations” of their arts. 
This kind of ‘knowing’ is different from the scientific knowledge that is 
spoken of today, resembling, rather, what is called kotsu (# “knack”; 
lit., “bone” or “pith”) in Japanese. It is said to be something which is 
suddenly attained and self-acquired; it is not something which can be 
taught. It is not objective knowledge, but something which might be more 
appropriately termed “fundamentally subjective knowledge.”8 Further­
more, whereas intuition remains objective and contemplative, kotsu is 
something which is at work, something which is subjective. It is not a 
‘negative’ or passive knowledge that is aware of things external to itself, 
but knowledge-at-work. Kotsu is not a mere intellectual function but a 
functioning knowledge. It might be termed a positive, active knowledge. 
In the traditional Japanese arts, there have been, since ancient times, 
methods of discipline through which this kotsu is attained. The original 
meaning of concepts like “oral transmission” (□{£ kuden) or “secret 
transmission” hiden) must reside in the attainment of kotsu in this 
sense.
8 shutaitdci chishiki. Shutai, which plays a central role in the author’s way of
thinking, is, in its genuine sense, that which admits of no objectification, the Self to which 
nothing remains external, for which reason it is translated as “fundamental subject,” 
in distinction to a mere internal subject.
However accomplished a master of an art may be, he cannot, outside 
the confines of his art, be considered to have totally overcome all human 
contradictions, and to have attained total unity. Even a man considered 
to be an “incarnation” of his particular art cannot be called an unbrokenly 
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responsive human being. Such a man, though he may not come upon 
any insurmountable barriers within the domain of his art, may well, in 
the total, living matter of his human existence, encounter unanticipated 
barriers of this kind. In other words, antitheses still remain and con­
tradictions are left unresolved. Hence it is that one must become an 
accomplished master in the total, living matter of human existence.
A man of moral virtue more than a master of an art, and a man of 
philosophy or a man of religion more than a man of moral virtue, are fully 
concerned with the total, living matter of being human. Scholars of 
ethics, philosophy, and religion are also concerned with the question of 
man in general, and while the expression of that concern runs the gamut 
from the scientific-objective to a standpoint which is philosophic and 
oriented toward human life, it is the latter which must constitute the 
essential approach. It is not the objective and impartial study of ethical, 
philosophical, or religious phenomena, but gaining knowledge of how to 
“live” morality, philosophy, or religion, that must be the essential concern. 
Gaining knowledge of how to live in a total way must be the essential 
concern.
One who makes an objective study of how to live in a total manner lives 
his life while viewing it from the outside; there is not, on his part, the 
slightest “application” (l^ kufu) in living, no tempering or practicing of 
what it is to live. This kind of scholar does not make the living of a total 
life his essential concern. It is an approach which is exemplified by scholars 
of ethics who do not necessarily have a deep concern about how to live 
morality. They think that the living of morality is one thing, and the 
study of ethics quite another. They further think that the essential task 
for the scholar of ethics is the objective and impartial treatment of ethical 
concerns. Contemporary scholarship in ethics is of this sort, and certainly 
this approach is not only possible but acceptable as well. Nevertheless, 
when it comes to the scholarly investigation of ethics, or the question of 
ethical knowledge, must it not be more essential to acquire a living 
knowledge of how to put ethics into practice—a knowledge only to be 
acquired through living the life of ethics ? Must the true student of ethics 
not be one who strives to gain or has attained such a living knowledge ?
The modern, Western-style academic discipline of ethics has driven 
this traditional approach to the “learning” of ethics out of the world of 
legitimate studies, thus bringing about the decline and annihilation of 
the latter. This traditional approach to ethical knowledge and the study 
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of ethics involves a subjective knowledge of ethics (it can even be called 
“fundamentally subjective ethics”), and thus differs, in both meaning and 
methodology, from the modern, Western-style scholarship, in which knowl­
edge of ethics is sought objectively and impartially. In the East, this 
“fundamentally subjective ethics” is to be found in the “learning” of 
ethics and the striving to “know” morality. As a mode of ethical knowl­
edge, it must be said that “fundamentally subjective ethics” is far more 
essential than the Western-style approach.
The Confucian Analects, for example, is a work which expresses a funda­
mentally subjective knowledge of ethics, and is indeed an example of 
“fundamentally subjective knowledge.” “Fundamentally subjective 
ethics” does not attempt to clarify the essential meaning of ethics through 
an objective and impartial knowing of ethics; it is rather a living, working, 
“fundamentally subjective knowledge” which lives ethics. The essence of 
that kind of ethics which is acquired through objective, impartial study is 
not a living, working knowledge, but a merely objective one. Scholars of 
ethics do not, by knowing this essence, become ethical. The true essence 
of ethics must be of such a nature that when one knows it, the knower 
immediately becomes ethical. To know this living, working essence of 
ethics must be the purpose of “fundamentally subjective ethics.” It is only 
through the living of ethics that this approach to the study of ethics is 
actualized. And it is only through moral discipline that this study pro­
gresses. Otherwise, however painstakingly one investigates ethics in an 
objective and impartial manner, however precisely one may come to 
know the essence of ethics in this sense, it will remain impossible to gain 
even the slightest fundamentally subjective knowledge of morality. For 
this reason, it is conceivable that even the best scholar of ethics in the 
Western sense may be a poor scholar of Eastern ethics.
In the East, the primary meaning of “learning” or “knowing” does not 
reside in the acquisition of objective and impartial knowledge, but in 
gaining fundamentally subjective knowledge. The Japanese awareness of 
the nature of Western-style ethics is by no means a recent development, 
but even today people ridicule a scholar of ethics who is immoral, or 
consider his life to be a contradiction. This is because of the time-honored 
view of “knowing” in the East, which holds that the act of knowing should 
be fundamentally subjective. From the standpoint of humanity, it can 
hardly be permissible for a scholar of ethics to be immoral. And yet, 
considered merely as a ’scholar’ of ethics, a man’s being immoral need not 
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be at all in conflict with his professional expertise. When the matter is 
viewed in this manner, a feeling of incongruity would be out of place. 
Nevertheless, if the primary aim of “learning” ethics must in fact be the 
attainment of fundamentally subjective knowledge, that anyone with even 
the slightest claim to be a scholar of ethics, whether in the Western style 
or otherwise, should neglect to undertake to obtain fundamentally sub­
jective knowledge—this can hardly but seem an incongruity.
From the outset one must fully recognize that Western-style ethics, 
while derived from merely intellectual rather than moral imperatives, has 
greatly contributed to the so-called academic world and also has indirectly 
proved useful to morality itself. And yet, it must be said that for man 
fundamentally subjective knowledge occupies a superior position. Insofar 
as merely objective knowledge is concerned, the study of morality and the 
study of art are of equal import; there is no reason whatsoever why, for 
man, the scholarly investigation of morality should be rated above the 
investigation of art. From this standpoint, knowledge which is objectively 
valid is superior in rank. That the study of morality is placed higher than 
the study of art is because, when the study of the former is subjective, the 
living knowledge which enables one to live morality is superior, from the 
point of view of man, to that which enables one to live art. In other words, 
the study of morality is to be ranked above the study of art only in cases 
wherein the former is rooted in fundamentally subjective knowledge.
Fundamentally subjective ethics perhaps tends to be identified with 
practical ethics, but contemporary practical ethics is comprised solely of 
objective knowledge, being devoid of the subjective. More than is true of 
one who is only a scholar of ethics, the scholar of practical ethics might be 
expected to live ethics himself, or at least to have deep concern with what 
it means to live ethics. And yet, the pursuit of the study of practical ethics 
does not mean that one will practice ethics, nor does it mean one will gain 
fundamentally subjective knowledge for that practice. On the contrary, 
the study of practical ethics lacks the slightest concern with the actual 
/iwng of ethics. It is no more than a field of study which concerns itself 
with learning what it would be to live ethics. In his academic 
endeavors, the scholar of practical ethics does not practice morality in 
the least. Consequently, practical ethics belongs to a completely different 
category than fundamentally subjective ethics. The study of morality in 
the Western sense differs completely from what has been referred to in the 
East, since ancient times, as “learning the Way” michi o manabu 
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or ^il gakudo). Therefore, progress in the study of morality does not di­
rectly bring about progress in morality itself. A scholar of ethics, however 
excellent he may be as such, will not for that reason see the appraisal of 
his moral being rise even an inch.
The contemporary academic fields of philosophy and religion are, in 
this regard, no different from the study of ethics. They fall into the same 
category. Philosophy and religion must, from their essential nature, make 
their primary aim the actualization of man’s total, vital, fundamentally 
subjective, and ultimate unity. In other words, their aim must be that the 
fundamental subjectivity of man should come to be the totally and 
ultimately unified self. To live philosophy or to live religion, in the root 
sense, must mean that man achieves an ultimate unity of self, in a funda­
mentally subjective manner. That is, man must achieve his ultimately 
unified, fundamental subjectivity. Herein lies the reason that living 
philosophy, or living religion, is the highest and most critical matter for 
man. Should philosophy itself, as is the case with those contemporary 
academic disciplines which are classified as sub-divisions of philosophy— 
the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, 
moral philosophy, aesthetics, the philosophy of religion, social philosophy, 
the philosophy of history, etc.—remain an attempt to comprehend the 
myriad discrete phenomena on the basis of the so-called academic im­
peratives, then, even though this effort may be undertaken by means of 
a basic method which is specifically called ‘philosophical,’ philosophy will 
not function in a fundamentally subjective manner to make of man an 
ultimate unity. Furthermore, if philosophy does not concern itself with the 
realization of this unity of man, or, what is worse, should it fail to even 
treat this problem objectively, then philosophy will be only a particular 
and intellectual concern, though it may be a basic one. Philosophy in this 
sense, one would be compelled to say, is not worthy of being taken up as 
the highest and most critical concern for man.
The original concern of philosophy is not merely a matter of intellec­
tually investigating particular phenomena, basic as that investigation may 
be. It must entail elucidating the total being in a total manner. By eluci­
dating in a total manner is meant, not a merely intellectual elucidation, 
but rather an elucidation in which the whole draws together, becoming 
one, and operates as one body and with full force. The elucidating function 
is not merely an intellectual one; it is a function in which the totality 
works as one body. It is the total function of the total being. It is a working 
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in which all the functions come together and converge on the point of 
their working. That the total being works in this way to elucidate its total 
self—this is what is meant by elucidating in a total manner. The essential 
elucidation of philosophy must be this kind of total elucidation. The 
original “task” of philosophy must be a total task which the total being 
imposes on itself, not a merely intellectual task. Elucidating this total 
“task” in a total manner, by means of the total function of the elucidator, 
must constitute the essential work of philosophy.
To live philosophy in this manner is no mere intellectual affair. It must 
consist in man’s attempt to live ultimately. The term “elucidating in a 
total manner” means nothing other than to live ultimately. For this rea­
son, to live philosophy is not just a matter of sapitntia (knowledge). It must 
be that which constitutes the concern of a (true) sapiens-faber? What is 
generally referred to as “the philosophy of human life” or “life philos­
ophy”9 10 sets out to elucidate, not particular phenomena, but the totality 
of human life. At present, however, this philosophical approach is largely 
made up of concerns which are merely intellectual. Its task is not a total 
task, nor is the function which elucidates this task a total function. The 
elucidation is therefore not a total elucidation.
9 That is, “not just a matter of understanding {sapicntia), but of both understanding 
{sapiens) and working (Jaber) at the same time.”
10 jinsei tetsugaku and seimei tetsugaku, respectively; the author refers
to Dilthey’s Philosophic des Lebens below.
11 kyakkon ka. Zen term for the true Self. In Buddhist scriptures an awakened 
one is said to manifest thirty-two excellent physical marks, one of which is “feet standing 
firm and even.”
The “task” of philosophy is a total one, and one which the total being 
imposes on itself. This must mean, not that the total being takes up as its 
task something other than itself, but that it takes up itself as its task. Most 
emphatically stated, the task of philosophy lies “directly beneath one’s 
feet.”11 In other words, the total being itself is the task. That the total 
being, which is itself the task, elucidates itself in a total manner by means 
of itself, is to live philosophy. That which is elucidated and that which 
elucidates are here neither one nor different. That which elucidates, in 
and through its elucidation of the task, elucidates itself. Through the 
elucidation of the task, that which elucidates is elucidated. Moreover, the 
one who lives philosophy in this sense, if, for example, it is T who is doing 
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the lining of philosophy, is none other than ‘I’ myself. It is not something 
which is separate from *1*, not something which transcends ‘I’, and not 
something which is immanent in ‘I*.
When it is said that the total being, which is itself the task, elucidates 
itself in a total maimer by means of itself, this may sound like Hegelian 
dialectical thought. While the term “total being” as it is used here may 
be taken to mean something like “Idea” (Idee)y the “Idea” is not the 
dialectical philosopher himself. The Idea is something the dialectical 
philosopher grasps as the principle of the world. The dialectical philosopher 
who grasps this Idea is not himself that Idea. Herein resides the reason 
why dialectical philosophy differs from the kind of philosophy being 
advanced here.
When only the “Idea” develops dialectically, the dialectical philosopher 
himself does not develop together with it in a total manner. The philoso­
pher merely grasps the Idea as an object, or, in order to grasp it, speculates 
dialectically. For this reason, one who undertakes philosophy dialectically 
does not, through that undertaking itself, elucidate himself totally and in 
a fundamentally subjective way. On the contrary, for the dialectical 
philosopher, philosophy may be quite different from this kind of self­
elucidation. However, for man in his totality, the total and fundamentally 
subjective elucidation of the self ought to be, even for a pre-eminent 
dialectical philosopher, a far more important concern.
If, in order to be consistent with the use of the term “fundamentally 
subjective ethics,” we single out the philosophy described here as “funda­
mentally subjective philosophy,” this latter is eminently religious and 
adapted to practice. That philosophy must be the ultimate concern of man 
is because philosophy is the fundamentally subjective, ultimate unity for 
man. And yet, what is today called philosophy is not at all like this. 
Philosophy does not even concern itself with this matter of man’s ultimate 
unity, and this must be said to drag philosophy down from its original rank 
of ultimacy and to deprive it of its primary significance. Today philosophy 
has so far departed from its primary area of concern that few people, in­
cluding the philosophers, feel it strange that those who are called phi­
losophers do not attain to a total, fundamentally subjective unity of self, 
and in fact do not even undertake the attempt to attain to it. If one 
attributes this to a change in man’s conception of philosophy, that is true 
as far as it goes, but no matter how much this conception may change, 
there is no altering the fact that the ultimate concern for man must be the 
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attainment of fundamentally subjective, ultimate unity. It must be the 
living of philosophy in a fundamentally subjective manner.
Oriental philosophies, such as those of the Four Confucian Classics, 
Lao-tzu, and Sung dynasty Confucianism, as well as Buddhist philosophy, 
are all fundamentally subjective. To study in an ultimate manner means 
to attain to the unity of oneself in a fundamentally subjective, ultimate 
way. One who has not attained to the unity of self in a fundamentally 
subjective, ultimate way cannot be said to have studied ultimately. In the 
East, the primary significance of study, whether in the arts, in morality, 
or in these philosophies, is fundamentally subjective. Moreover, philosophy 
must rank highest among man’s fundamentally subjective studies. To 
“learn of man” or to “learn of human life” means that the one who “learns” 
makes it his highest aim to totally and ultimately attain to a unity of self. 
Apart from this, there is no “learning of human life.”
To “know human life” consists in nothing other than attaining to the 
unity of self in a total and ultimate manner. This is total, fundamentally 
subjective “knowledge.” It is neither mere objective knowledge nor mere 
intellectual function. The elucidation of the total “task” in a total manner 
is itself total, fundamentally subjective knowledge. The re-living of a 
“lived experience,” as advocated in the philosophy of life (Philosophic des 
Lebens) of Wilhelm Dilthey and others,12 remains only an objective 
knowledge of life. However concretely the essence of life may be grasped 
through the re-living of a “lived experience,” that essence is in the end 
only objective, not subjective. The fundamentally subjective essence of 
life is not something which may be attained by re-living a “lived ex­
perience” ; it must be attained by the living of life itself. Needless to say, 
though this essence of life may be attainable, it is not something which can 
be attained objectively.
12 Dilthey, Ernst Troeltsch, Eduard Spranger, and so on in Germany; Bergson and 
those influenced by him in France.
The essence of life is not the re-living of a “lived experience” as some­
thing objective. It consists in living life in a fundamentally subjective 
manner. To “live philosophy” in a fundamentally subjective manner does 
not mean to re-live lived experience. It must mean nothing other than to 
live a unified and fundamentally subjective life. To “learn life” or to 
“know life” in a fundamentally subjective manner, entails overcoming not 
only intellectual contradictions, but overcoming the total contradiction
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of life in a total manner. Consequently, living is knowing and knowing is 
living. This, of course, does not mean ‘knowing’ in the sense that living 
beings ordinarily know themselves, that is, in the sense of self-awareness. 
If the proposition were to be interpreted in that way, living beings would 
only know reflectively and objectively about the living of life. This would 
not be the kind of knowledge which works in a fundamentally subjective 
and total manner to live life, having overcome the contradiction of life. 
Bergson’s “intuition” is also objective, not subjective, because he means by 
“intuition” to know the concrete forms of life while flowing alongside life.
It would seem that both modern Western philosophy, and also contem­
porary philosophy in Japan, which has been influenced by the West, are 
too partial to strictly intellectual concerns. The problems of philosophy 
are too disparate and departmentalized; the original, primary significance 
of philosophy appears to be too often neglected. Herein lies the reason 
why in the West as well, men must reflect on ancient and medieval 
philosophy, and particularly on the time-honored, fundamentally sub­
jective philosophy of the East. Again, for the same reason, it must be de­
manded of the philosopher that he be something of a sage.
The study of religion is now encountering the same problems; not only 
the study of religion as an empirical science, but even its study as a 
philosophical undertaking, are nothing more than an effort to know reli­
gion in a merely objective way. At present, the same is true of the study of 
Buddhism. The study of Buddhism as it is currently conducted, no matter 
how impartial and discerning it may be, is not such that the undertaking 
of scholarship means “living a Buddhist life.” To gain knowledge of 
Buddhism through studies of this sort is one thing, while to live a Buddhist 
life is quite another. This kind of knowledge of Buddhism, although it 
involves a ‘knowing* of Buddhism (in the objective sense), is not a knowl­
edge which leads to the living of a Buddhist life. This cannot be the essential 
meaning of what it is to “know” Buddhism.
To “know” Buddhism must mean to live a Buddhist life. To know Bud­
dhism must mean to know Buddhism in a fundamentally subjective man­
ner. Furthermore, to know Buddhism in a fundamentally subjective manner 
must be grounded in man’s attempt to elucidate himself in a total and 
fundamentally subjective manner. The essential meaning of “learning” 
Buddhism is to know Buddhism in a fundamentally subjective manner.
It is said that contemporary Buddhist studies have broken new ground, 
but this has completely failed to serve man in a Buddhist way, and what 
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is more, as a consequence of this development Buddhism is in the process 
of being turned into something anachronistic and dead. This decline stems 
from the fact that the way in which Buddhism is being ‘learned’ is not 
fundamentally subjective. If in the Buddhist world the meaning of learn­
ing Buddhism” comes generally to be taken in the modem academic sense, 
Buddhism will surely perish. If no one attempts to know Buddhism in a 
fundamentally subjective manner, as is already the case in the Buddhist 
world, then Buddhism will in all probability lose its essential life. For 
fear that “learning” Buddhism might fall into this kind of deluded under­
standing, and thus turn away from the essence of Buddhism, the ancient 
Buddhist sages strongly warned against the academic apprehension of 
Buddhism. The rise of Zen in China, with the expression, “Not relying 
on words or letters,/ An independent Self-transmitting apart from any 
teaching,”13 in particular, as its banner, can be looked upon as a form of 
self-criticism carried on within Buddhism itself. This criticism taught that 
one should forsake the fetters of the all-pervasive academic approach that 
was predominant at the time, in favor of returning to the fundamentally 
subjective knowledge that is the original essence of Buddhism.
13 Cf. the author’s “Zen: Its Meaning for Modern Civilization,” EB I, I (1965), pp. 
22-47.
Learning Buddhism has at present completely degenerated into academic 
understanding, to the extent that the ‘knowing’ involved is merely ob­
jective. There is reason to fear that even Zen will degenerate into an 
academic understanding of the Shobogenzd, and fall into an understanding 
of the koan that is simply intellectual. Insofar as ‘learning’ Buddhism does 
not turn away from academic understanding and objective study in the 
Western style, to return to fundamentally subjective study, there can be 
no realization of the true knowledge that is the essence of Buddhism. So 
long as this change does not occur, Buddhism will not come back to life.
A man who has fundamentally subjective knowledge is not simply 
sapiens (knowing person) but, at the same time, faber (worker). Funda­
mentally subjective knowledge is not merely an intellectual activity in the 
narrow sense, but a knowledge that lives and works in a total, funda­
mentally subjective manner. With this knowledge, to work in a total and 
vital way is completely one with knowing in a total and vital manner. To 
work is to know; to know is not to know something. To know and to 
work are not separate. It is neither the case that after having come to 
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know, one works, nor that after having come to engage in work, one knows. 
To work is knowledge. And yet, this does not refer to an intellectual func­
tion in the narrow sense. Rather it means to be sapiens and, at the same 
time, to be Jaber.
Those who are known as masters in the various traditional arts are men 
of an unhindered freedom in whom knowledge and work are one. Their 
work is knowledge and their knowledge is work. When it is said of a master 
that he “knows” his art, this means, not that he knows his art objectively, 
as though it were an academic pursuit, but that he “works” in his art. 
Masters of the arts are sometimes said to be incarnations of their arts, 
and an incarnation of an art is none other than the essence of that art. 
For a master to attain the essence of his art is one thing, while for a scholar 
to grasp the essence of that art is quite another. Even if a scholar grasps 
the essence of an art, he cannot work in that art, but when a master attains 
the essence of his art he can work in that art in unhindered freedom. 
Working knowledge is of the quality of Jaber. It is only through knowledge 
of the Jaber variety that we can hope for progress and creation in the various 
arts.
The masters of the various arts have attained fundamentally subjective 
knowledge in their respective arts, yet they cannot be said to have ulti­
mate, unified, fundamentally subjective knowledge. Those who are called 
saints and sages, however, have this latter kind of knowledge. Saints and 
sages are not simply men who have attained to the mastery of some 
particular art, but men who have attained to the Great Way of humanity, 
men who have realized the essence of what it means to be human. Al­
though one speaks of masters of the various arts, one does not refer to saints 
and sages of particular arts. This is because when one speaks of saints and 
sages one does so in terms of man in his totality. The word ‘saint’ has 
still a moral ring to it, and the word ‘sage’ still carries the implications of 
sapiens. A man who has attained ultimate, unified, fundamentally sub­
jective knowledge is, however, neither a merely moral man, nor merely 
a man of sapientia. He is a total man, sapiens-Jaber.
If the appellation “a man of attainment” (&A tatsujin) is employed, 
not in terms of the ‘ways’ of the various arts, such as the ‘way’ of swords­
manship, but in terms of man in his totality, then this expression would 
seem to be best suited to the total man of sapiens-Jaber. It is only in this 
kind of “man of attainment” that the true ordinary mind is found. The 
ordinary mind must be total, unified, fundamentally subjective knowl-
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edge. In other words, it must be a fundamental subject which is the whole 
actualization of total, ultimate unity.
When the venerable Zen master Nan-ch’iian, well known in connection 
with the ancient case concerning the killing of a cat,14 was confronted by 
his disciple Chao-chou, who is renowned for his role in the koan about 
whether a dog has the Buddha-nature,15 with the sudden question, “What 
is the Way?,” Nan-ch’iian effortlessly responded, “Ordinary Mind is the 
Way.”16 This answer of Nan-ch’tian’s has become very famous. The Way
14 Nan-ch’Uan P’u-yiian (j., Nansen Fugan; d. 835). The killing of the cat is found 
in Chao-chou lu (j., Joshu roku, “The Record of Chao-chou”), no. 6 (cf. Akizuki RySmin’s 
edition, Chikuma shobo, 1973) and Wu-men-kuan (j., Mumon kan, “The Gateless Barrier”), 
no. 14.
13 Chao-chou Ts’ung-shen (j., JoshQ Jushin; d. 897). Cf. Chao-chou lu, no. 132, and 
Wu-mon-kuan, no. I.
16 hrijoshin zedo. The Zen master Ma-tsu Tao-i (j., Baso Doitsu; d. 788)
uses the term heijoshin in its original sense in which it is contrasted with shojishin 
(“life-death mind”). “[Ma-tsu said:] ‘The Way does not require practice to attain to 
it. Only do not contaminate it. What is meant by contamination? [It means] only that 
there is the life-death mind which seeks—this constitutes contamination. Let me tell 
you, if you directly realize this Way, you will know that it is none other than ordinary 
(tranquil and constant) mind. What do I mean by ordinary (tranquil and constant) 
mind? It is our being free from “making,” free from right and wrong, free from “take” 
and “forsake,” free from annihilation and eternity, free from unawakened and awakened. 
The scripture (Vimalaklrti nirdeia) states, “That which is neither the practice of the 
unawakened one nor of the awakened one, that is the practice of the bodhisattva.” Our 
present walking, staying, sitting, and lying, every response to opportunities, and contact 
with others—these are all the Way. The Way is the dharma-world. The wondrous 
functionings of the awakened one which are as innumerable as the grains of sands of the 
[Ganges] River do not go beyond the range of the dharma-world. ... All our walking- 
staying-sitting-lying are so many functionings that go beyond thought” Ching-tc ch'uan- 
teng lu (Kcitoku dento roku, “The Transmission of the Lamp”), ch. 28. With both Ma-tsu 
and Nan-ch’iian, heijoshin means the Ordinary Mind awakened to its true Self and 
functioning in its everyday activities—that is, what the author calls the creation of 
Suprahistorical history. (Cf. Chao-chou lu, no. 1: “On another day the Master (Chao- 
chou) asked his master Nan-ch’iian, ‘What is the Way?’ Nan-ch’iian said: ‘Ordinary 
(tranquil and constant) mind is the Way.’ The Master asked: ‘Can one go after it?’ 
Nan-ch’iian said: ‘If you seek after it, you immediately fall away from it.’ The Master 
said: ‘If you do not even seek, how could you know that that is the Way?’ Nan-ch’iian 
said: ‘The Way does not belong to knowing or to not knowing. Knowing is a delusion; 
not knowing is merely the temporary suspension of delusive knowing. Once you really 
attain to this, the Way that is free from doubt is like the great void—vast, empty, 
open. How can it be that one should discriminate this from that?* Upon this the Master 
immediately realized the truth, his mind like a bright moon.”)
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referred to here is the Great Way of man, the unsurpassable Way, the Way 
which mankind should tread and practice. In Buddhism this is also called 
“Unsurpassed Right Awakening.”17 A scholarly master of scriptural 
teachings could not definitively answer this question about the Way, even 
if he were to use millions of words. To this searching question with which 
he was faced, Nan-ch’iian’s answer is in effect, “When hungry, I eat; 
when tired, I sleep.” In this there is indication of a truly unhindered, 
Self-abiding realm which only a “man of attainment” can reach.
17 Sk., anuttara-samjak-sambodhi. What the author means is that awakening is at 
once Self and the Way by which the Self lives.
18 shogeUi. From Chao-chou lu, no. 335: “A questioner asked: ‘What is the Way ?’ 
The Master [Chao-chou] said: ‘That which is outside the wall.’ The questioner: ‘I’m 
not inquiring about that.’ The Master said: ‘Which Way are you asking about, then?’ 
The questioner: ‘The Great Way.’ The Master said: ‘The Great Way leads to Ch’ang- 
an.”’ Also, ibid., no. 363: “A questioner: ‘Can a dog have the awakened Self-nature?’ 
The Master said; ‘The front of each house leads to Ch’ang-an.’ ”
When Chao-chou, who had posed this question to Nan-ch’uan, was in 
turn asked by a monk, “What is the Way?,” he parried by saying, “That 
which is outside the wall.”18 I wonder if he did not mean by this that there 
was a “highway” outside the wall. Indeed, it would have to be said that 
this expresses a wondrous mode of existence attained by the fundamental 
subject, a mode of existence which stretches in all directions and to which 
nothing in the world is external.
Usually, the “Way” is thought of as being a “norm” or a “principle” 
for man to follow, or understood to mean “form,” as opposed to “matter.” 
Considered from the standpoint of Idealism, categories such as norm and 
form are transcendent; they are principles with which matter accords 
itself. Form and matter are neither identical nor separate, and in the actual 
world they never completely become one. It is thought that without the 
combination of form and matter there cannot be anything actual, but this 
is not to say that form and matter are completely unified. That which is 
actual is neither pure form nor pure matter. Form always transcends 
matter, and matter follows form. That which is actual is thought to be 
involved in an endless process of approaching pure form.
In the philosophy of value, “form” is only a norm used in arriving at 
value judgments, but in the philosophy of history form is something 
dynamic, something which enables history to develop—it is the beginning 
and the end of history. Whether form is viewed to be static, as in the
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philosophy of value, or viewed to be dynamic, as in the philosophy of 
history, it is after all transcendent and of the nature of an object; it is not 
fundamentally subjective in the sense that the term has been used in this 
paper. In the case where history is viewed as the development of form it­
self, form is considered to be immanent and subjective, but insofar as form 
is not a total actualization of itself, form is not fundamentally subjective 
in the sense that is intended here. Anything like the total actualization of 
form itself is impossible for form as it is ordinarily conceived, that is, for 
form as the ‘subject’ of history.
The reason why form is considered the ‘subject’ in the philosophy of 
history is because the immanent aspect of form—form as a necessary 
“Moment” in the structure of that which is historically actual—is made 
absolute. In other words, the Idea, in Plato, is considered to be originally 
transcendent and otherworldly, but that which is actual necessarily 
partakes of the Idea. When the Idea, which is thus embodied in the actual, 
is made absolute in its immanence, and history is interpreted as its develop­
ment, there arises the notion of an immanent, developing Idea. However, 
even if form is considered, in this way, to be immanent and ‘subjective,’ 
since form itself does not achieve total actualization of itself, it is not 
fundamentally subjective in my sense of the term.
The actualization of “form” is always self-limiting and finite. Form is 
experienced only in its self-limitation. It is said that form is only actualized 
as that which is actual in history. And yet it is thought that while form, 
through its actualization in history, limits itself and becomes finite, at the 
same time it transcends actuality and, being infinite, cuts off limitation. 
Only when form is taken in this sense can it be the form which is the sub­
ject of history.
That which is actual is said to be a combination of form and matter, 
but when this question is considered from the standpoint of form as the 
subject of history, that which is actual constitutes the self-limitation of 
form. Though when form and matter are considered dualistically the two 
come to be combined, in the dynamic monism of form matter serves as 
the medium for the actualization of form.19 In Plato’s thought, actuality 
has only a passive role with respect to form. From the standpoint of form, 
actuality is only to be negated. There is no positive, affirmative reason 
why form must combine with matter.
19 As with Aristotle and Hegel.
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In the philosophy of history, on the other hand, “form” actualizes 
itself only through its combination with matter, that is, only through self­
limitation. Self-limitation, therefore, is the necessary self-development or 
self-actualization of form. In this view, “matter” comes to be seen as 
something positive and affirmative. Consequently, the act of self-limitation 
on the part of form, or its combining itself with matter, does not represent 
the corruption of form. Rather, this must be regarded as the expression 
of the essence of form. Only form in this sense can affirm history and 
constitute the principle which makes history possible.
The terms “absolute nothingness” and “absolute negation” are, in the 
philosophy of history, synonymous with “form” as it has just been de­
scribed. Form, through self-limitation, actualizes itself. However, while 
this kind of limitation of form constitutes the establishment and affirma­
tion of what is actual, at the same time it must be the negation of what is 
actual, that is, the negation of the limited self. It is in the limitation of 
the self and, moreover, in the infinite negation of what is limited, that there 
is found the absolutely negative character of form, or its character of 
“absolute nothingness” zettai mu)t which constitutes the principle
of history.
If reality, which is the self-limitation of form, is understood as affirma­
tion or “being,” then this affirmation or “being” will be unable, within 
history, to abide as such. Were affirmation, or “being,” to abide, there 
would be no history. These, however, undergo negation, and in this there 
is found the meaning of form as absolute nothingness. Being, while it is 
the self-limitation of absolute nothingness, is also, insofar as it must be 
negated, “non-being.” It is in this sense that that which is actual in history 
is said to be being which is none other than non-being. In this respect, in 
the philosophy of history, as compared to Platonic philosophy, terminology 
is employed with the opposite meaning. For Plato, form is being and matter 
is non-being.
“Form,” as the term is used in the philosophy of history—or the 
“absolute nothingness” which functions as the principle of history—is not 
completely other-worldly and objective, external and transcendent, as is 
the case with an ideal or a merely conceptual goal that is to be sought 
after, whether this goal or ideal be mutable or immutable in the realm 
of eternity. Rather, form in this sense, or, alternatively, “absolute nothing­
ness,” lies at the base of that which is actual in history, “lives in history,” 
and itself constitutes the immanent subject of history. Furthermore, this
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subject of history, in that it eternally creates that which is historically 
actual, is “absolute being” and of immanent character, but at the same 
time, in that it eternally negates its self-limitation, it is “absolute nothing­
ness” and of external and transcendent character. In this, form and matter 
are not dualistic. The self-limiting aspect of the subject which lives history 
is matter; the negating aspect of self-limitation is form. That the historically 
actual is negation which is none other than affirmation, is because the sub­
ject which lives in history is possessed of this kind of structure.
That which is historically actual does not come into being through the 
combination of form and matter. Rather, that which is actual is of the 
character of negation that is none other than affirmation, and hence, 
‘form’ and ‘matter’ are only dualistic abstractions. Form and matter as 
the “Momente” of history are not dual entities. They are none other than 
the dynamic and reciprocal aspect of the subject of history. Through self­
limitation, the subject of history expresses itself and transforms itself into 
“being.” By negating that which has been transformed into being, it 
comes to acquire the creative character of self-limitation. If the subject 
of history were fixed as some particular being, its self-limitation would 
become deterministic, and its creativity in history could not but be 
annihilated. That history is infinitely creating is due to the fact that 
absolute nothingness is the subject of history. In this fact that the subject 
of history is absolute nothingness resides the freedom of historical form 
from determinism.
The view that form is indeterminate may seem to be opposed to the 
predominant thinking of Greek philosophy concerning form, but the view 
that looks on form as something determinate results from partial observa­
tion which sees only the self-limiting aspect of form and overlooks the 
negating aspect of self-limitation. If form is regarded as something deter­
mined, its self-limitation would result in the negation of form, without 
giving form any affirmative expression. History, in this event, could not 
but become something negative. In the Platonic view of actuality or in 
certain kinds of religious world views, in which the historical world is 
regarded as a degenerate world, or as a lower world, there is a preponder­
ance of thought which is based upon a deterministic view of form, or of 
a view of form as something external and transcendent. This view of form, 
however, is not only incapable of explaining history, it finally negates our 
historical life, and is unable to give any positive meaning to it.
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If it is given that one cannot leave the historical world even for a mo­
ment, or even take a single step away from it, ordinariness must mean the 
daily actuality of the historical world. It goes without saying that even 
should one consider a life after death which is temporally remote from 
actuality, or a heavenly beyond separated spatially from this world, these 
cannot be called ordinariness. Even in the historical world, an external, 
transcendent form or ideal cannot be called ordinariness. All of these, on 
the contrary, are distantly removed from ordinariness, and furthermore, 
will always lie beyond the reach of ordinariness. Thus, ordinariness must 
mean the everyday actuality of the historical world. But how is it that 
this daily actuality of the historical world can be called the “Way,” as 
Nan-ch’iian did ?
As was mentioned above, if it were a ‘form’ or a ‘norm’ that is meant 
by the “Way,” then something which is external and transcendent, and 
is removed from everyday actuality, would, conversely, constitute the 
“Way.” In this case, ordinariness would be something which ought to 
accord itself with the Way, and, at times, something which would even 
oppose itself to the Way. Ordinariness taken in this sense would inevitably 
come to mean something that cannot possibly be called the Way. How 
is it, then, that ordinariness is the “Way”?
If, as Nan-ch’iian said, ordinariness must indeed be the Way, the Way 
cannot be of the nature of a transcendental form or norm to which 
ordinariness ought to accord itself. Instead, it must be that in the Way, 
the everyday actuality of history is none other than the form of history. 
In other words, ordinariness does not mean “ordinary existence” which 
accords itself with form. “Form” must be taken to mean that kind of 
form which does not hold outside itself the ordinary existence that is in 
accord with it. However, this does not mean that a certain everyday 
actuality in history serves as the norm for some other actuality. Rather, 
it must be that everyday actuality itself, in and of itself, is the norm. The 
assertion that ordinariness itself is the norm does not indicate that this 
ordinary existence constitutes the norm for some other thing. It is instead 
that ordinary existence and the norm are one and the same.
Everyday actuality is not a stage in the process of the realization of 
an ideal, or a means directed toward an end. Everyday actuality itself, 
in and of itself, is the ideal, the end. This is not mere realism or naturalism. 
It is of the nature that, “each and every being is perfect as it is,” and that,
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“between particulars there is no obstruction.”20 But is it not conceivable 
that people will assume that this view of reality is only possible with “form,” 
as it was explained above, as the subject in history?
20 kokoenjo and jijimuge, respectively. The former is Yiian-wu
K’o-ch’in’s (j., Engo Kokugon; d. 1135) comment in Pi-jen lu (j.t Hekigan roku; “Blue 
Cliff Records”), no. 62; the latter is a term from Hua-yen Buddhism.
Indeed, with form as the subject in history, to live in history is itself the 
aim and the ideal, and thus it may be that the everyday actuality of history 
itself comes to be thought of as the Way. However, when this matter is 
more carefully considered, it is apparent that ‘form as the subject in his­
tory/ in the sense that the expression is used here, is none other than a 
principle which affirms the historical world of actuality as it is as a given, 
and which elucidates in a philosophical and fundamental manner how 
this affirmation is possible. Even if this principle is one in which the coming 
into being of history-as-a-given is elucidated, it is not a principle which 
enables the criticism of history-as-a-given itself, nor is it a principle which 
affirms or negates history-as-a-given in principle.
This means only that history as it is given can best be elucidated from 
a standpoint such as that of subjective form. It cannot be the concern of 
this subjective form whether or not that history-as-a-given, which can be 
elucidated by subjective form, is after all capable of being ultimately 
supported as itself. Neither, accordingly, can this matter be at all a con­
cern of the philosophy of history, which takes as its purpose only the 
elucidation of history-as-a-given. The problem here is that of whether the 
support of history itself is possible, and this problem must be one which 
goes beyond the bounds of the philosophy of history. The religious view 
of history arises when the sharp scalpel of criticism is applied to the 
question of whether history itself can after all be ultimately supported as 
itself. Religion does not take the position that history is everything, or that 
history is central. That man has religion is proof in itself that he is not 
satisfied with the view that history is everything, or that it is central.
It is with history as a basis that the particular actualities of history 
criticize other particular actualities. However, the criticism by history 
of history itself is not a matter of history. History holds within itself the 
criticizing of history itself. In this respect, history itself denies, from the 
outset, that history is everything, or that it is central. This criticizing of 
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history itself reveals the contradictory movement which is contained in 
the foundation of history. This is the movement wherein history ultimately 
negates itself.
It has already been mentioned that, as history is not merely an affirma­
tion but at the same time a negation, there is necessarily within history a 
negating “Moment” which negates history itself. This negating “Moment” 
is at the same time affirmative and causes history to arise. It is not a con­
tradictory movement which criticizes history itself and is the complete 
reverse of the direction of history. When in the course of history great 
obstacles are encountered and history comes to a ‘standstill,’ confronting 
crisis, it is thought that history becomes negative. However, in this under­
standing, no matter how grave the crisis may be, the result will be no more 
than a criticism of particular historical actualities or situations, and not a 
criticism of history itself. Such a grave crisis may on the contrary be thought 
of as a “Moment” leading to an even greater affirmation of history.
The criticism of history itself is not something which arises as a par­
ticular actuality or event in the course of this historical process. It is 
conceived, rather, deep in the womb of history itself, and has been so from 
the beginning. In other words, the very fact that history is history makes 
it necessary that history criticize itself. History is history in that it is con­
tradiction which is none other than unity, non-being which is none other 
than being, inconstancy which is none other than constancy, anxiety which 
is none other than tranquillity. It is only as something of this nature that 
history is possible; it is because history is of this nature that it must 
criticize itself and negate itself as something of this nature. Consequently, 
the “Moment” through which history must be negated is to be found 
neither in the aspect of history as mere unity, nor in the aspect of history 
as mere contradiction. It lies in the fundamental structure of history— 
unity which is none other than contradiction.
In the fact that unity and contradiction are mutually contradictory 
resides the ultimate contradiction of history itself. This ultimate contradic­
tion is not an ‘ultimate contradiction’ in the sense of a “Moment” wherein 
history arises, as is maintained in the philosophy of history. It is an ultimate 
contradiction in the sense of the negating “Moment” of history through 
which history itself is negated. This is the ultimate contradiction of history 
itself—its ultimate crisis, its ultimate inconstancy, its ultimate dilemma, 
and its ultimate anguish. Again, herein resides the ultimate criticism of 
history itself. This ultimate criticism is not merely something made from
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an external standpoint; it must be the total, fundamentally subjective 
criticism of history itself.
The Buddhist parable concerning the venomous snakes and the robbers, 
from the Samyutta Nikaya2' and the story of the two rivers, by Shan-tao,21 2 
are good examples of this fundamentally subjective criticism. When reli­
gion regards the world as ultimately inconstant, ultimately false, ultimately 
evil, ultimately defiled, or enmeshed in original sin—and when it is held 
that this is inevitably the case—this attitude must by all means derive 
from the view of history just described. It must not derive from a mere 
rendering ultimate, in a sentimental or panic-stricken manner, of in­
constancy or the contradictions of actuality.
21 MPHUI Zd-agon-gyo 43 {Taiiho 2.313; no. 1172). For an English translation of the 
Pali source, see “The Snake” (chapter xxxv), 77^ Book of Kindred Sayings (London; 
Pali Text Society, 1927), volume iv, pp. 107-110.
22 §31 (j., Zendd; d. 681). Cf. D. T. Suzuki (trans.), The Kyogyoshuisho (Kyoto, 1974), 
PP- 99-100-
To live in history without being aware of the abyss of this ultimate 
contradiction, which lies in the foundation of history itself, is just as if one 
were to hold a thousand-ton bomb and stare down into a ten-thousand- 
foot pit. To live in history so as to affirm it, contenting oneself with seeking 
solutions to the relative contradictions of history and thus achieving a 
unity, must be called so relaxed and superficial an approach that the 
contradiction at the root of history will surely not be resolved, and the 
efforts to resolve the branch contradictions of history will not be entirely 
successful. This explains why contradiction is irresolvable within the 
historical dialectic, and it explains the necessity of advancing to what 
may be called the “religious dialectic.”
The term “religious dialectic” refers to that which overcomes the ulti­
mate contradiction of history itself, the contradiction which is contained 
in the depths of history, though history does not confront it, and which, 
consequently, the historical dialectic can never entirely resolve. Thus, the 
religious dialectic goes beyond the abyss of history, and extricates itself 
from history, which, pervaded with ultimate anxiety, is constructed over 
the abyss.
What is called religious “salvation” or “emancipation” must mean, not 
merely the removal of the particular contradictions and anxieties of his­
tory, but this “casting off” achieved through the religious dialectic. This 
“casting off” must be none other than the ultimate, total elucidation which
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was referred to previously. Ultimate, total elucidation is not merely his­
torical, subjective elucidation; it means confronting the ultimate con­
tradiction of this historical, subjective elucidation, in other words, 
confronting the abyss of history. It means that history, as abyss and 
ultimate contradiction, dissolves itself, dies to itself (the Great Death), 
and casts itself off totally, in a fundamentally subjective manner. This is 
the ultimate “overcoming,” the ultimate unification.
What is referred to as the “Great doubt block” is certainly not simply 
an intellectual doubt, nor is it a particular, relative, subjective “task” in 
history. It is ultimately contradictory, subjective history itself. Apart 
from the self-dissolution of this subject of history, apart from the “casting 
off” of history itself, there is no breaking up of the “Great doubt block,” 
that is, no “Great Awakening.” It is for this reason that the Great doubt 
block must be the total, fundamentally subjective task, and that Great 
Awakening must be total, fundamentally subjective elucidation, funda­
mentally subjective knowledge. The Great doubt block does not resemble 
an Idea which, as task, is to be solved by history’s living history; it is, on 
the contrary, the ultimate contradictoriness of the subject of history itself. 
This is a supra-historical task which history is unable to elucidate in his­
tory. Elucidation of this task is nothing other than the “casting off” and 
self-dissolution of the subject of history, which ceaselessly and without 
limit faces the abyss of its own ultimate contradiction. Thus the subject of 
history goes beyond this abyss, freeing itself with the emergence of the Self­
abiding, unhindered fundamental subject which has cut off all contradic­
tions with a single cutting.
When we speak of the Great Way that reaches every quarter and opens 
out on all sides without hindrance,23 this means precisely the fundamental 
subject which, having died, returns to life. That path which lies outside 
he who treads it is not the Great Way; that ‘fundamental subject’ which 
treads a path that lies outside itself is hardly worthy to be called the 
fundamental subject. Wherever this fundamental subject treads, without 
exception, is the Way. This is called the Great Way. For this fundamental 
subject, there is no particular path to be followed as the Way—thus it is 
called the Way Without Way. Only in this sense can the Way be that 
Great Self-abiding Way, in which one goes if one wants to go, and sits if 
one wants to sit. It is this that is Nan-ch’iian’s Way; his “Ordinary Mind”
23 Cf. note 16.
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must be this fundamental subject. Herein there is no longer any Way 
apart from the Mind, no Mind apart from the Way. Mind and Way are 
one; there is nothing further the Mind need strive to attain. If there were, 
outside the fundamental subject, a path to be treaded by the fundamental 
subject or something to be sought by the fundamental subject, then there 
would be that which the Mind need strive to attain. But as Nan-ch’iian 
said, “If you seek after it, you fall away from it”24 If there is nothing to 
strive to attain, then, as Wu-men comments in verse, “Nothing idle 
weighs heavy on the mind.” “In spring, flowers; in summer, the cool 
breeze; in autumn, the moon; in winter, snow”—just as they are.25 This 
is the Great Way, apart from which there is no Buddha for one to seek, 
no Pure Land to be attained. Our ordinariness is itself the Buddha Way, 
the Pure Land.
24 Cf. note 16.
25 Wu-men-tuan, no. 19. These are Wu-men Hui-kai’s (j., Mumon Ekai; d. 1260) 
comments upon Nan-ch*(ian’s remark. Cf. note 14.
The casting off and self-dissolution of the ultimately contradictory sub­
ject of history and its freeing of itself with the emergence of the unhindered, 
Self-abiding, fundamental subject, is not achieved in the movement of 
history, that is, through the historical dialectic. It is accomplished at the 
root-source of history, which is prior to the birth of history. In living in 
history itself there is an ultimate contradiction, and thus, this ultimate 
contradiction cannot be resolved by means of living in history. It can only 
be resolved through the self-dissolution of history itself. Therefore, though 
the term ‘the casting off and self-dissolution of history’ has been used, 
this means that history “casts itself off” and returns to what it is prior to 
its own birth. Similarly, when the phrase, ‘the freeing of the fundamental 
subject with the emergence of unhindered, Self-abiding, fundamental 
subject/ is employed, this must mean that the fundamental subject of 
history casts itself off and returns to the root-source fundamental subjec­
tivity that is prior to the birth of history. Only in this way, without either 
ascending into heaven or attaining rebirth in the Pure Land, can the fun­
damental subject, which has cast itself off and emerged as the unhindered, 
Self-abiding, fundamental subject, restore to history, as the root-source 
fundamental subject of history, the ultimate unity which is original to 
history. Again, as the root-source fundamental subject of history, this 
unhindered, Self-abiding, fundamental subject can make history into the
28
ORDINARY MIND
wondrous form of the root-source fundamental subject, and lend to living 
in history its wondrous activity.
The True Buddha, as is spoken of in Buddhism, is none other than this 
root-source fundamental subject. The true Buddha Land is none other 
than that historical world in which the fundamental subject is this root­
source fundamental subject. What Nan-ch’uan means by “Ordinary 
Mind” is this root-source fundamental subject sporting in samadhi (iff ft 
jugezammai) throughout the historical world. The Zen master Ta-sui 
Fa-chen, when asked by a monk, “When your life-and-death comes to 
you, what will you do?” replied, “Coming to tea, I take tea; coming to 
a meal, I take a meal.” This single utterance, one could certainly say, 
well expresses the depths of ordinariness of this root-source fundamental 
subject of Ta-sui, which had gone beyond the abyss of ultimate contradic­
tion.
Translated by Tokiwa Gishin 
and Howard Curtis
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